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In situations where the traditional instruments of trade policy are not available, protection for
import-competing industries can be given only indirectly. One of the candidates of giving
indirect subsidies is environmental regulation. The competitiveness of a domestic industry can
be improved by low emission taxes, by low environmental taxes on the consumption of the
industry's output, or by low quality standards that have to be met by the goods that are
produced by this industry. The paper looks at these instruments in a partial-equilibrium setting.
There are a domestic and a foreign industry that produce goods that are regarded as imperfect
substitutes by the consumers. Firms are price takers. The government has five policy
instruments at its disposal: the emission tax rate, taxes on the consumption of domestic and
foreign goods, and environmental-quality standards for domestic and foreign goods. In a first
step, the small-country case is addressed. Two lobby groups that are interested in influencing
environmental policies are considered: the owners of an industry-specific factor and
environmentalists. The process of regulatory capture is modelled via a poMcal-support-
functLon approach. Two cases are distinguished. First, the lobbies capture only single policy
instruments. Second, they capture environmental policy as a whole. It is seen that some
counter-intuitive results turn up, and this is explained by the fact that lobbies and policy makers
are interested in providing protection in the most efficient way. Then we look at the large-
country case where environmental policies affect the terms of trade. It is seen that regulatory
capture may lead to welfare gains since lobbies sometimes happen to internalise part of the
external effects arising in the international policy game.
1 The Problem
Most of the theoretical literature on environmental regulation in open economies has
looked at optimal policies. See Markusen (1975), Merrifield (1988), Rauscher (1991a), Krutilla
(1992). What are the emission tax rates or environmental standards that would be chosen by a
benevolent government in order to maximise social welfare? Unfortunately governments are not
benevolent in reality. Therefore, the optimal policies derived in this literature may serve as a
reference point of what can be achieved, but they do not explain what is. In the real world,
policies and policy instruments chosen by governments and administrations are rarely those
which are regarded as being optimal by the economic theorist. In environmental policy, the
command-and-control approach is still much more common than emission taxes or tradable
permits although the merits of these instruments have been praised by economists for decades.
In trade policy, protectionism is omnipresent and there is even a tendency to move from
relatively efficient instruments (tariffs) to inefficient ones (voluntary export restraints).
There are in principle two ways of explaining the deviations of actual policy decisions
from the ones recommended by economic theorists.2
- Firstly, the voting process itself may lead to inefficient policies. Economic welfare analysis
is usually based on the concept of the representative individual whose utility^-is to be
maximised. If voting behaviour is introduced, however, differences between individuals
begin to matter. In a direct democracy, the policies are deterermined by the preferences or
perceptions of the median voter. And the interests of the median voter may differ from the
interests of the average voter, who may be view as the representative individual of the econ-
omy. Since income and wealth distributions are usually skewed to the left, i.e. the majority
of the voters (and the median voter as well) is relatively poor, this theory would predict a
tendency of redistribution from the rich to the poor. As long as the proposal is a lump-sum
redistribution scheme, this does not cause inefficiencies. If, however, the policy instruments
to be decided upon affect the allocation of resources in the economy (Tike tariffs and
environmental taxes), the resulting policy tends to be distortive.
- Secondly, in most countries the voter does not decide directly on issues that are relevant for
her or him. Most decisions are delegated to the government or to the public administration.
Since the control of the politician by the electorate is imperfect, politicians enjoy discretion
in their decisions and they will use this discretion to maximise their own well-being. For
instance, they may be able to increase their political support by giving presents to her
clientele. Since this is usually not done by lump-sum transfers, non-efficient policies are
likely to be adopted. Moreover, in the competition for these presents, resources tend to be
wasted for redistributional purposes.
The median-voter model is useful in explaining economic and environmental policies in
direct democracies like Switzerland, where voters themselves can decide on issues they
consider to be relevant. But even in situations where voters do not decide directly, the results of
the median-voter model are useful as a benchmark. If the well-being of the policy maker in a
representative democracy depended only on the preferences of the voters, she would act as an
agent of the median voter and choose the appropriate policies. See also Mueller (1989, ch. 10).
The median-voter model will not be discussed here. For an application to the theory of tariff
formation see Mayer (1984). He has shown that trade policy tends to be biased if the factor-
ownership distributions differ between factors. The median voter over-represents the interests of
the more equally distributed factor. If it is realistic to assume that the distribution of
environmental harm across the population is more equal than the distribution of capital
ownership, there is not much reason to argue that the resulting environmental policy should be
biased by protectionist interests.
The emphasis in this paper, however, will be placed on the decisions that are made in
representative democracies. In particular we are interested in the problem of regulatory capture,
i.e. in situations where policies that are meant to enhance economic welfare are modified to
serve the idiosyncratic interests of powerful subgroups of society. * Examples are environmental
product standards that discriminate against foreigners and the enforcement of domestic
environmental process standards outside the territory of a country. The policy instruments
considered in the model are environmental taxes, standards, and tariffs, and the idiosyncratic
groups are sector-specific factors of production and environmentalists.
2 Representative Democracy and the Capture of Environmental Regulation in an
Open Economy
Regulatory capture is a problem typical for representative democracies. The term
describes a phenomenon where regulatees are able to exert some influence on the regulating
The term "regulatory capture" is due to Stigler (1971) and his paper contains some good examples of which
shapes regulatory capture can take.3
institutions and to bias policy decisions in their own favour. Often, this leads to discrimination
against competitors and to the adoption of inefficient policies. We will briefly survey the
insights concerning the mechanism of regulatory capture that have been gained by public-
choice theorists.
The precondition for regulations to be captured by idiosyncratic interests is that voters
are not perfectly informed. If they were, any politician not acting on behalf of the voters would
be punished by not being re-elected. Downs (1957, chs. 11-13) has argued that a rational voter
will indeed be uninformed to some extent because the costs of being well-informed are high.
This rational ignorance results in an imperfect control of the policy-making process by the
electorate and it gives the politician some discretion in her or his decisions. The discretion is
utilised by particular interest groups who are then able to affect political decisions in a way the
electorate would not tolerate if it were informed. The basic questions to be answered by a
theory of regulatory capture are threefold:
1 Who is interested in influencing the political decision-making process?
2 Who is able to influence the political decision-making process?
3 How is the influence over the political decision-making process exerted?
The first question has a simple answer. Everyone should have an interest in influencing
the political process in her or his favour. However, the willingness to spend resources on
exerting this influence is unevenly distributed. In many cases, the group of beneficiaries of a
policy intervention is rather small whereas the group of losers is large.2 in a direct democracy
with majority voting, such a policy would not be adopted. In a representative democracy this
may be different. The willingness to spend resources on lobbying activities depends on a
number of parameters that ure unevenly distributed among different sub-groups of society. The
most important one is group size. If the gains from a policy intervention are highly
concentrated, i.e. they are appropriated by a small group, then the gains accruing to an
individual member of this group are large. If the welfare losses arc widely dispersed, the share
of the costs to be borne by an individual member of the losing group is small. Thus, an
individual belonging to the first group has a large incentive to place effort and resources on
activities directed towards an influence on politics whereas the incentive is small in the case of
a member of group two. Typically, group one consists of the producers that are active in a
particular industry; group two usually consists of consumers or tax payers. The consumers of
environmental quality constitute a special case. About twenty years ago, they would have fallen
into category two. However, this has changed with the raising influence of non-governmental
environmental organisations and green lobbying is becoming increasingly important.^
For the construction of a model in which interest groups matter, a decision has to be
made whether to use a partial or a general-equilibrium framework. In the partial equilibrium
framework, one neglects the possibility that the general-equilibrium repercussions of policy
measures may offset their direct and straightforward effects.^ It may, however, not be far-
fetched to assume that lobbyists are usually unaware of the general-equilibrium effects of their
An example is trade protection of an industry by tariffs or subsidies. The gains accrue to workers and capital
owners in this particular industry whereas the costs have to be borne by the economy as a whole.
It may be true that the power of green lobbies has been over-emphasised in the past. Peirce (1991, p. 282),
for instance shows that out of more than 500 pressure groups that are formally represented at the European
Communities only seven represent consumers' or environmentalists' interests.
See Rauscher (1994a) for a model where interest groups lobbying for "competitiveness" benefit from
stringent environmental policies because the general-equilibrium effects of such a policy are positive and
dominate the direct increase in production costs. The general-equilibrium framework has been used by
YounglMagee (1986) and Magee/BrockiYoung (1989) for the investigation of trade barriers.activities. Moreover and more importantly, the model framework is decisive for the
identification of what constitutes an interest group. Partial-equilibrium and specific-factors
models find that interest groups are sector-specific whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts
that sectoral effects of policy changes are irrelevant because, in the long run, factors are
perfectly mobile across sectors. Thus, they are completely indifferent where to be employed.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that factors of production should constitute economy-
wide interest groups. Empirical evidence presented by Magee (1980) suggests strongly that
industry-specific rather than factor-specific lobbying coalitions are formed when trade policy is
at disposal. This indicates that interest group formation is based mainly on short-term object-
ives and that the potential to move to another sector if one's own industry is hit by a policy
measure is not considered to be a realistic alternative. Therefore, we will choose a model
framework where factors are tied to a particular sector of production.
If a group of persons is interested in achieving a policy change, this is a necessary but
no a sufficient condition for the change actually taking place. Each interest group faces an
internal free-rider problem. By fighting for her own interest, a group member also fights for the
other group members. Thus, she provides a public good and like all public goods this public
good will be under-provided: the marginal benefit to the individual is smaller than the marginal
benefit to the group. Interest groups have to overcome this free-rider problem to be influential.
The conditions for this are that the group be small, that the group be homogeneous and have a
common interest. See Olson (1965). A relatively small and homogeneous group like a dozen
steel producers in a single country may be more effective in solving their free-rider problem
than the large and heterogeneous group of downstream producers, consumers and tax payers
that may be negatively affected if the government decides to support the steel industry by
means of tariffs, subsidies or administered prices.
The relationship between the policy maker and a lobbyist may be thought of as one of
mutual exchange of gifts or of supply and demand. The lobbyist demands economic support
from the policy maker and can help the policy maker to increase her political support. The
policy maker is desirous of political, support and can supply economic support to the lobbyist.
There is a potential for gains from trade. The exchange of gifts may take the following shape. In
a situation where voters are imperfectly informed about what is going on in politics, the
politician can increase her political support, e.g. the probability of being re-elected, by spending
money on advertising. This money is offered by specific interest groups that are ready to
contribute to the politician's election campaign if the politician recognises the needs and wants
of these interest groups in a sufficient manner.
The exchange of gifts can be modelled in various ways. See Ursprung (1991). The
most realistic framework is the multi-lobby multi-party model. In this model, also referred to as
the interest-group-cum-electoral-competition model, two games take place at the same time.
Interest groups play against each other by giving campaign contributions to different
candidates. The candidates themselves play against each other by choosing their policies such
that their probabilities of being elected are maximised. These two games are linked because the
probabilities of being elected depend on the campaign contributions the lobbies are willing to
make. For applications of this model framework to trade policy see YounglMagee (1986) and
HillmanlUrsprung (1992,1994). 5 A simpler way of modelling interest group influence on
public policies is to assume that political platforms are given. In this case, the whole problem
reduces to a probabilistic voting model which can be thought of as a special case of a rent-
* A special variation of this type of models has been considered by LaffontlTirole (1991) who distinguish the
government as a legislator and the public administration as the government's agent. Both may be subject to
lobbying activities by interest groups and LaffonllTirole derive policy equilibria with regulatory capture.5
seeking game. See Tullock (1980) for the original contribution and Brooks/Heijdra (1989),
MitchelllMunger (1991) and Nitzan (1994) for surveys. This modelling framework has been
applied to environmental policy by BartschlRauscherlThomas (1993). An even simpler categ-
ory of models emerges if the so-called political-support function approach is considered. It is
assumed that the policy maker is influenced by various interest groups and the policy maker's
objective function is a weighted average of the welfare functions of the individual lobbies. This
approach is due to Peltzman (1976) who used it to model regulatory capture. The political-
support function model may be thought of as a reduced form of a more complicated model in-
volving games between interest groups and policy makers who wish to maximise the probabil-
ity of being elected. See CoughlinlMuellerlMurrell (1990) and Grossman!Helpman (1994).
Finally, the government and the members of state bureaucracy have some independent
goals and may be able to follow them due to the lack of control by the voter. These goals
include maximisation of the tax revenue, shirking and unproductive status-signalling activities.
See Niskanen (1973), for instance. Of course, these objectives are not idiosyncratic to the public
sector and its employees. Employees of private firms have similar interests but they are often
better controlled and the incentives to perform well are usually stronger. Although the leviathan
state is an interesting subject of economic analysis, it will not be addressed here. The activities
of a Leviathan government in a trading economy are not much different from those in a closed
economy and, therefore, their consideration would not contribute much to the analysis of
regulatory' capture of environmental policies in a trading economy .6
For the following analysis, I have chosen a partial-equilibrium framework. A single
import-competing industry is considered. The foreign industry produces a similar good which
the home country imports. These goods are close substitutes and, therefore, the possibilities to
pass increases in the production costs through to the consumers are limited. In order to keep the
model tractable, I assume that the firms act as price takers. If there were non-price taking
behaviour, the optimal emission tax rate should contain components that correct for the market
imperfection. In order to avoid this, we will start from a competitive setting.^ The lobbies are
an industry-specific factor of production and an environmentalist interest group. The
environmental-policy instruments that are subject to regulatory capture in this model are taxes
on emissions from production and consumption and a minimum environmental product quality
standard. 8
3 A Partial-Equilibrium Model Regulatory Capture
Consider a market where two goods arc traded. One good is produced in the home
country and the other one is imported from abroad. These goods are substitutes. Firms maxim-
Moreover, many of the results would be ambiguous anyway. If, for instance, one includes the target of
administering a large budget in the policy maker's objective function, the effect on the optimal tax rate may
be positive or negative, depending on whether tax revenue is an increasing or declining function of the tax
rate. In the case of a hill-shaped Laffer curve, the effect on the optimal tax rate depends on whether the tax
rate which generates the maximum tax revenue is located to the left or to the right of the welfare-maximising
tax rate.
HillmanlUrsprung (1992,1994) have looked at models with non-competitive producers. They lobby for
increases in profits and the paper shows that the lobbying equilibria depend, inter alia; on the market
structure, i.e. on the number of firms.
The issue of choice of instruments will be neglected. For instance, there are good reasons as to why
industries as well as environmentalists may prefer quantitative instruments of environmental policy to taxes
or tradable-permits schemes, in particular under non-competitive market conditions. See HoekmanlLeidy
(1992) and Leidy/Hoekman (1994). However, these arguments are not altered by the existence of trade and
the desire for protection from foreign competition and, therefore, this issue will not be taken up here.6
ise their profits and take prices as given. The government can use its environmental policy to
give protection to domestic industries that compete in international markets. It can do this in
three ways. Firstly, taxes that internalise consumption externalities can be modified such that
they discriminate against foreign products. This is nothing else but a tariff policy. Secondly, the
government may relax emission taxes or environmental standards and pollution abatement re-
quirements for particular production processes or industries. This reduces production costs and,
therefore, has the character of a hidden subsidy. Thirdly, environmental product standards may
be used to discriminate against foreign suppliers of goods. It is assumed here that the pollution
intensity of consumption is not exogenous but is determined by the producer who decides on
the design of the final product. Since environmentally friendly goods are more expensive in
their production than less environmentally friendly goods, the government may wish to restrict
the choices of the producer by imposing an environmental product standard." Product standards
are subtler means of protection than tariffs and they have been a continuous source of inter-
national trade disputes. Often it is only a matter of interpretation whether a specific product
standard is primarily a measure of environmental protection or consumer safety or a means of
discrimination against imports. ^ From the view point of the policy maker, these standards
have the great advantage of providing protection in a rather discreet way. Environmental
protection and environmental protectionism are difficult to disentangle.
1 start by presenting the structure of the model. The two countries are name the home
and the foreign countries; all lower-case variables refer to the home country and the
corresponding upper-cse variables refer to the foreign country. Let us assume that there are
constant returns to scale. The unit-cost function £(.,.,.) has as its arguments the environmental
tax rate, t?, the remuneration of the specific factor of production, r, and the environmental
product standard, <y, which is measured by the negative pollution intensity of consumption, b:
ofc-b. Thus the smaller b, the larger (o and the stricter the environmental regulation. The
properties of the unit-cost function are
c, >0, cr >0, cu <0, crr<0, crt >0, c^Ca-c^
2 20,
The foreign industry's unit-cost function, C(R,T
e,Q) has the same properties and Q = - B is the
domestic quality standard for foreign products.
The demand side is characterised by demand functions for domestic and foreign
products, d(p,P) and D(pJ>), respectively, where p and P are the prices of domestic and foreign
goods. The demand functions satisfy
dp<0,dp>0,Dp>0,Dp<0,dpDp-dpDp>0,
i.e. none of the goods is a Giffen good, the goods are substitutes and the final inequality is a
stability condition which is satisfied if the own-price effects dominate the cross-price effects.
The equilibrium in this market is determined by six equations. Free entry and exit
together with profit maximisation imply that the producer prices equal the marginal costs of
Alternatively, the government could use a variable scheme for the taxation of consumption goods, where the
tax rate depends on environmental friendliness. Although environmental-quality standards are non-price
instruments, they are equivalent to such a tax scheme. If there were uncertainty or problems of rationing in
the model or if we considered the possibility of environmental innovation, pecuniary instruments would do
better that the command-and-control approach. See Pearce/Turner (1990, ch.7) or Siebert (1994, ch. 8)
See HoekmaniLeidy (1992), for instance. European examples are the Danish-bottle case and the purity laws
for German beer and Italian pasta, that have all been subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice.7
production, which here equal the unit costs. The final goods prices are determined by adding
the consumption tax rates, f and 1°. The factor market equilibrium requires that the industry-
specific factor is fully employed. Factor demand follows from Shephard's lemma and factor
supply (k in the home country and K abroad) is exogenously given and fixed. Finally there are
the goods-markets equilibria: supply equals demand, i.e. q=d(p,P) and Q=D(p,P). Two of these
equations can be eliminated by combining the conditions for the goods market equilibrium and
the factor market equilibrium. Thus, we have
(1) p = c(r,t
e,co) + t
c,







Most of the following analysis will be restricted to the small-country case, i.e. it is assumed that
the foreign country's resource constraint, equation (2
1) is not binding. This implies that the price
of the foreign good depends on the foreign environmental policy and on the domestic quality




Total differentiation of equations (1) and (2) gives
ct ca 0 ^





The comparative statics follow from Cramer's rule and the detailed results arc reported in the
appendix. The qualitative results are summarised in table 1 and in proposition 1.
Proposition I
Tight environmental taxes or standards in the home country raise the price of domestic
goods, reduce the output of the domestic industry and raise imports. Tight quality
standards on imported goods raise the prices, reduce the demand for imported goods and
raises the demand for domestic goods. The effect on the income of the domestic industry's
specific factor is ambiguous. Foreign emissions from production are raised. Domestic
emissions from production are reduced in the case of an emission tax. The effect of a














































These results can be explained as follows:
- Prices. Tight environmental standards and emission taxes raise the costs of the firms who are
subject to these standards and taxes. Part of this is passed through to the consumers in the
shape of higher prices. This results in an increased demand for the other good, which is a
substitute, and therefore its price rises as well. Environmental consumption taxes raise the
price of the affected good and of its substitute. Some of the domestic policy variables do not
have an impact on the price of foreign good due to the small-country assumption.
- Output. Tight environmental standards and taxes lead to output reductions in the industry
affected by these standards and taxes. The producers of the substitute commodity will raise
their output since their price has been risen. ,
- Rate of return to capital. High taxes and quality standards raise the remuneration of the
specific factor of the industry producing the substitute commodity. The increase in the price
of the output of this industry induces output expansion and an increase in the demand for the
specific factor. Since the supply of this factor is inelastic, its price goes up. The effect on the
income of the specific factor of the industry affected directly by the tighter standards or
higher taxes is ambiguous in some cases. High consumption taxes unambiguously reduce the
remuneration of the specific factor. However, the effects of policy instruments that affect the
production costs, i.e. emission taxes and quality standards, are indeterminate. There are two
effects, a substitution effect and a demand effect. On the one hand, an increase in emission
taxes induces a substitution process: capital for environmental resources. With increased
demand for capital and fixed supply, this factor tends to become dearer. On the other hand,
the increase in production costs is passed through to the consumer and the consumer reacts
by reducing demand. If demand is elastic, the decline in output may be so large that the
specific factor becomes more abundant. Its price tends to decline. It can be seen from
equations (Ale) and (Ale) in the appendix that effects on the price and on the factor income
depend on the own-price effect of domestic demand, oL. If the absolute value of dp is large,
i.e. if demand is elastic, then the specific factor is harmed by tighter environmental
regulation. Otherwise, the substitution effect dominates and the specific factor gains. To
make this effect more plausible, consider capital in this model consisting of two components,
production capital and abatement capital. The owners of production capital lose if emission
taxes are increased, the owners of abatement capital gain. The effect on the aggregate capital
stock is ambiguous.
- Emissions. Higher emission taxes induce emission reductions in the industry directly
affected. This is plausible. The emissions of the industry in the other country are increased.9
This is due to the increase in output and to the increase in the price of the specific factor. The
latter effect induces a substitution of environmental resources for the specific factor. The
same argument can be used to explain the effect of a tighter product standard on the
emissions of the industry producing the substitute. However, the effect of a tighter product
standard on the emissions from the directly affected industry is ambiguous. The output is
reduced but the emission intensity of production may be increased.
Many of these results arc plausible. It is, however, remarkable that even in this simple
partial-equilibrium framework some counter-intuitive results are possible. Environmentalists
may find ambient quality being negatively affected by tight product standards. ** Moreover,
industry lobbies may be surprised to gain from tight environmental standards even if there are
foreign competitors that are not subject to these standards. In this context, it is interesting to
note among the domestic policy instruments that address the supply side of the economy
(emission taxes and product standards) the only instrument which has an unambiguous effect on
the remuneration of the specific factor of the domestic industry is the quality standard on for-
eign goods. The stricter this standard, the higher the income of the specific factor.
4 Optimal Environmental Policies
In a first step, we will look at a scenario where lobbies do not influence the political
decision making process. The difference between this model and many other models of
international trade and the environment (i) that we now look at a partial equilibrium, (ii) that
domestic and foreign goods are not perfect but only imperfect substitutes and (iii) that product
standards are considered as means of environmental policy. In order to concentrate on the
effects of interest group influence in the following analysis, it is assumed that transfrontier
pollution is negligible and that trade, i.e. international transport, does not cause additional
environmental harm. Thus environmental pollution in the home and foreign countries is
(5) z = ae + bq + BQ,
(5
1) Z = AE.
a, A, b and B are the pollution impacts of domestic and foreign emissions and of domestic
consumption of domestic and foreign goods, respectively. The utility derived from
environmental quality is u(-z) and U(-Z), respectively, and the utility functions have the usual
properties..
The benevolent government maximises the sum of consumer surplus, profits, the
income of the specific factor, the tax revenue and the utility derived from environmental
quality.
(6) w=-e(p,P;v) + (p-t
c)q-c(r,t




This is not an artifact of the model but this phenomenon is relevant for real-world problems. Improvements
of environmental quality in one dimension may cause environmental disruption in another one and it is not
clear that the net effect is always positive. It has been argued, for instance, that policies which encourage the
recycling of used materials can be counter-productive from an environmental point of view. It is not a priori
clear that recycling processes are less environmentally disruptive than the storage or combustion of waste
plus the production of final goods involving new raw materials rather than recycled ones. See
KlepperlMichaelis (1995) for a case study which deals with recycling schemes for metal scrap containing
cadmium.
Here we do not use the conventional notion of consumer surplus but the negative value of the expenditure
necessary to attain a certain level of consumer satisfaction, u The vector product of the derivative of this10
The policy instruments of the home government are f, T°, t?, b and B, and the foreign govern-
ment decides on the foreign emission tax rate, 7*. Differentiation of w and W and the use of
Shephard's lemma and the first-order conditions of profit maximisation to eliminate some of the
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It is assumed that the second-order conditions are satisfied. Equations (7a) to (7e) can be
rewritten in matrix notation:

















Since the matrix on the left-hand side has full rank, ^ the optimal policies turn out to be












function with respect to the prices and the changes in the prices gives the equivalent variation, which is an
exact measure of the change in consumer well-being. See Varian (1992, p. 162).
One could consider an export tax or subsidy which the foreign country could use to improve its terms of
trade but this will be discussed only in an informal way.
This follows from the fact that, according to equations (7.A2a,b,c,d,g,h) and (7.A3a,bd)






In the home country, the optimal tax rates equal the marginal environmental damages and the
optimal product standard is chosen such that the marginal cost of increasing product quality
equals the marginal improvement in environmental quality. It should be noted that even
commodities that.are very similar from the viewpoint of the consumer can be subject to
significantly different quality standards. These differences can be justified from the cost side.
Goods whose quality improvement is cheap should be subject to stricter standards than products
whose improvement is costly. If the second category of goods were subject to the same
regulation as the first one, the loss of consumer surplus due to the high price would exceed the
gain in environmental quality. The foreign tax rate (equation (7a
1) equals the marginal
environmental damage plus a positive term due to the terms-of-trade improving effect of tight
environmental standards.
4 Lobbies that Influence Single Policy Instruments
Within the framework of the political-support function approach, one can assume that
powerful interest groups can capture either environmental policy as a whole or only certain
aspects and instruments of environmental policy, e.g. merely the regulation of production or of
final-goods design. We start the analysis of regulatory capture by looking at the second case.
The more general and more complicated scenario will be discussed later on. Moreover, we will
restrict most of the analysis to the case of a single country, the home country. The interactions
of lobbying activities in different countries will also be discussed later.
It is assumed that all environmental-policy instruments except the one captured by the
interest group remain at their optimal levels and that their optimal levels are not affected by the
change in the captured variable. This is only possible if the utility of environmental quality is a
linear function of pollution. It is assumed that this is the case for the remainder of this
section. 15
There are two lobbies here, the industry-specific factor and the environmentalists. The
specific factor is interested in increasing its income, rk. The environmentalists are concerned
about environmental quality. Like HillmanJ Ursprung (1992, 1994), I distinguish "greens" and
"supergreens". The normal green lobby cares about the domestic environmental quality only;
supergreens in contrast take a more global view and are concerned about the environment in the
foreign country as well. Thus, the political-support function turns out to be
(9) w
where w is the social-welfare function defined in equation (6), and X and X
s are the weights of
the interest group stakes in the policy maker's objective function. X
s/X
8 is the importance the
green lobby places on foreign environmental quality compared to domestic environmental
1
5 Note that this assumption implies that the technology and the preferences over the consumption goods are
convex enough to assure that the second-order conditions of optimisation hold.12 ;
A
quality. It is reasonable to assume that 0< X
s <X
8. The extreme cases represent the interests of
the simple greens and the supergreens, respectively. According to Grossman/Helpman (1994),
the parameters also reflect the technology the policy maker uses to transform lobbyist contrib-
utions into votes or political support: *"
- A^ is the relative increase in the political support in case a sum of money previously used in
the private sector is given to the policy maker in the shape of a campaign contribution. For
example if AM).5, then an increase in campaign contributions by one dollar raises political
support by 1.5 times as much as a one-dollar increase in the disposable income of the private
sector.
- A?/A^ is the marginal and average utility the environmentalists derive from domestic
environmental quality.
- A
s/A^ is the marginal and average utility the environmentalists derive from foreign
environmental quality.
Under the assumption that only one policy instrument is captured by the lobbies, the
support maximising policies can be derived easily:
e ( „* dr ..('de dq dQ\ ,, dE~] Ide
(10a) t
e=aii+\-k























Notice that equations (10a) to (lOe) represent five different scenarios in which only one policy
instrument is captured by the interest groups. For each of these scenarios, there exist four
additional optimality conditions like equations (8a) to (8e) which determine the policy variables
that are not captured by the interest groups.
The results summarised in table 1 can be used to determine the biases in environmental
policies that re caused by regulatory capture:
- Emission taxes. The view of the specific factor is ambiguous. On the one hand, emission
taxes are bad because they raise costs and prices and reduce the demand for the domestic
good. On the other hand, substitution processes are induced and there may be an increased
demand for factors that are substitutes for environmental resources. It seems as if in the
present discussion of environmental policy much more emphasis is placed on the first
argument If this is true, the specific factor is anti-green. The view of the greeas is
ambiguous as welL Of course, domestic emissions will be reduced and the demand for dom-
Grossman/Helpman (1994) use a slightly different notation. The following propositions follow from their
equations (5) and (11) and from footnote 5 if the notation is adapted properly.Biblir
itutsfO-
13
estic goods will decline. This is good for the environment. But here will be substitution
processes on the demand side. The demand for foreign goods will be increased and since
consumption is environmentally harmful, the environmentalists may have an interest in
avoiding too-high tax rates. ^ If the greens care about foreign environmental quality as well,
the emission tax rate is reduced even further.
- Taxes on the consumption of the domestic good. The specific factor opposes these taxes
since they reduce its income. The view of the environmentalists is ambiguous again.
Domestic emissions and consumption of the home good are reduced but production of and
consumption of the foreign good are increased.
- Taxes on the consumption of the foreign good. The specific factor gains from these taxes.
The green position is ambiguous. Foreign emissions and consumption are reduced by a large
tax rate, but domestic emissions and consumption are raised.
- Quality standards for domestic goods. The position of the specific factor is ambiguous for
the same reason as in the case of emission taxes. The position of the greens is indeterminate
as well. High environmental quality standards reduce the pollution per unit of the goods
consumed as well as the number of the units of good itself, but the demand for foreign goods
is raised and foreign emissions in the production process are increased. The effect of
emissions from domestic production is ambiguous. It is possible, though unlikely, that they
are increased by tight quality standards.
- Quality standards for foreign goods. The specific factor will always benefit from this non-
tariff barrier to trade. The green position depends on the model parameters again. Tight
product standards reduce the pollution impact parameters and reduce demand for the
regulated good. However, the domestic substitute will be produced and consumed in greater
quantities and this causes additional environmental disruption. The effect on foreign
emissions is ambiguous, but under normal circumstances, they tend to decline.
The positions of the two interest groups towards the various policy instruments are less
obvious than one would guess after a first thought. In particular, the green position always
depends on the parameters of the model since policies that reduce domestic emissions and
consumption of the domestic good tend to raise foreign emissions and the consumption of the
foreign good. If, however, the own-price elasticities of the goods are substantially larger than
the cross-price elasticities, then the indirect effects of a policy, which affect the production and
consumption of the substitute good, are dominated by the direct effects and the green position is
unambiguous:
Proposition 2
If the power of the specific factor in the lobbying process is large, then the quality
requirements foreign goods have to meet are too high, the tax on consumption of foreign
goods is too high and the tax on consumption of domestic goods is too low. If the direct
effects of environmental regulation dominate its indirect effects, strong green lobbies tend
to bias the environmental policy towards high emission taxes, high consumption taxes,
and high environmental product standards.
As a corollary, we obtain
1
7 Equations (7.A2c) and (7.A2d) reveal that besides the pollution intensity parameters b and B, the values of
the own-price elasticity of demand for the domestic good and the cross-price elasticity of the foreign good
decide on the sign of the net effect of the changes in consumption on environmental quality.14
Proposition 3
If the direct effects of environmental regulation dominate its indirect effects, then
industrial and green lobbies have a common interest in strict standards for the quality of
foreign goods and high taxes on the consumption of foreign goods. They are opposed to
each other in the case of taxation of consumption of domestic goods. They may be
opposed to each other in the cases of emission taxation and domestic product quality
standards but it is also possible that both of them lobby for high domestic emission taxes
and strict quality standards for domestic goods.
This result has the following implications:
- High taxes on foreign consumption goods may be in the interest of domestic producers and
environmentalists, but tax differences (which are nothing else but tariffs) are very obvious
instruments of protection and, therefore, resistance by foreign producers and the foreign
government has to be expected.
- High environmental quality standards for foreign goods serve the interests of domestic
industry lobbies and tend to be supported by environmentalists. Moreover, and this is
important for real-world issues, they are often not easy to be detected as protectionist
devices.
- The last part of the proposition is a bit surprising. Industry specific factors profit from tight
regulation if the price elasticity of demand is small. Then the substitution effect dominates
the demand effect and strict environmental policies raise the factor income. This result is a
consequence of the introduction of aggregate capital as a homogeneous factor of production.
The share of this capital which is used for pollution abatement will profit from tight
environmental standards but it is questionable whether in reality this effect is strong enough
to offset the negative impact of tight taxes and standards on the remuneration of normal
production capital. ^
Thus, the implication of this model for practical purposes is that of the instruments
discussed here the discriminative use of environmental product standards is the only one which
(i) is likely to be supported by a coalition of lobbies in the home country and (ii) whose
protectionist content can be obfuscated rather easily. Thus, such standards are first choice if
environmental and trade protection are to be combined.
5 Regulatory Capture of More than One Policy Instrument
^ Let us now turn to the more general case where the lobbies influence environmental
policy as a whole. Again the policy maker's objective is to maximise her political support,
defined by the political-support function, equation (9). In matrix notation, the first-order
conditions are
It should be noted that this is not a phenomenon specific to open economies; it is also relevant for industries
that are not affected by international trade.01)





































The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied. Due to equations (Alb,d,f,h),
(A2a,c,e,g) and (A4a) to (A4e) in the appendix, this can be rewritten
(12)
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If «' is constant, the impact of the lobbying activities can be derived directly from these
equations:
- The taxation of domestic consumption goods is affected positively by environmental lobbies
and negatively by the lobby of the specific factor. This result is intuitive. Concerns about
foreign environmental quality do not influence the taxation of domestic goods.16
- Taxes on foreign consumption goods are increased if domestic concern about environmental
quality at home and abroad rises. The interests of the industry-specific factor have no impact
on the tax rate. At a first glance, this is surprising since domestic industries would get
protection by high tax rates on foreign goods. This is nothing else but a tariff. However, it is
well-known that the same degree of protection can be achieved more efficiently by means of
direct subsidies, i.e. by lowering the consumption tax rate of the good the industry produces
itself. Since the policy maker maximises her political support, she will always choose the
most efficient means of supporting the lobbies.
- Emission taxes are positively influenced by domestic environmental lobbies and by the
specific factor of production. They are not affected by concerns for foreign environmental
quality. That the influence of green lobbies on the policy making process raises emission
taxes is not surprising. The positive effect of industry lobbying, however, is counter-intuitive
and deserves an explanation. As has been shown earlier, a high emission tax rate has two
effects on the remuneration of capital. There is a negative effect due to the decline in demand
and a positive effect due to substitution. The efficient policy to deal with the demand effect
is a subsidy on consumption. A lower emission tax rate achieves the same objective in a
more costly way and is, therefore, not chosen by a rational policy maker. However, the
efficient way to induce substitution processes that benefit the specific factor is a high
emission tax. This result becomes more intuitive if the specific factor is interpreted as an
aggregate of two factors one of which is used for output expansion and the other one for
pollution abatement. The pollution-abating factor gains from strict regulations. The capacity
factor benefits from lax regulation but it can be helped in a more efficient way by means of
low consumption taxes. * 9
- Domestic product standards are positively affected environmentalists and by industry
lobbies. That industry lobbies seem to like tight environmental standards, has the same
reason as in the case of emission taxes. The demand effect can be addressed in a more cost-
effective way by relaxing consumption taxes. However, high-quality goods require more of
the specific factor for their production than low-quality goods and this raises its
remuneration.
- Standards on foreign product quality are influenced by the concerns of domestic environ-
mentalists about domestic and foreign environmental quality. Surprisingly, the influence of
supergreen lobbies leads to less restrictive environmental product standards. To interpret this
result, recall that an increase in the product quality has two effects. On the one hand, demand
is reduced, output goes down, and this improves environmental quality. On the other hand,
cleaner products have higher production costs, i.e. they require more inputs. Since one of
these inputs is an environmental resource, tighter product standards tend to raise the emission
intensity of production. The efficient way to deal with the first effect is a tax on con-
sumption, but not a quality standard. See equation (13b). The remaining second effect can be
addressed by a reduction in the product quality standard.
The results derived here can be summarised as follows:
The result that a competition among pressure groups favours efficient policy instruments has been
established by Becker (1983, p. 386). For the present model, it can be shown that the combined effects of low
consumption taxes and high emission taxes are indeed beneficial to the specific factor. Consider an initial
situation without lobbying, i.e. A^=0. Then a marginal increase in A reduces the consumption tax rate and
increases the emission tax rate. Using equations (7.Alb) and (7.Ale) from the appendix, one can establish
that17
Proposition 4
Lobbying activities of the industry-specific factor result in low consumption taxes on
domestic goods, high emission taxes and high environmental quality standards of
domestic goods. Green lobbying leads to high taxes on production emissions, on the con-
sumption of domestic and foreign goods and to tighter product quality standards. The in-
fluence of super green lobbies leads to higher taxes on the conswnption of foreign goods
and to less restrictive quality standards for these goods.
The results concerning the influence of the industry-specific factor are counter-intuitive
and perhaps also counter-factual. They are due to the assumption that the government acts
completely rationally and always uses the most efficient instrument to provide protection to th
interest group. Owners of pollution abatement capital are supported by standards and taxes that
influence the production process. Owners of usual production capital are subsidised by means
of low consumption taxes but not by means of any other instruments since their use would
cause greater income losses to the general public than subsidisation. Anecdotal evidence,
however, suggests that industry lobbies tend to lobby for lax emission taxes and product
standards rather than for the converse, the only exception being standards that affect the foreign
competitors more severely than the domestic industry itself. The results derived from the
theoretical model, therefore, raise the question as to whether the political-support-function
model is a realistic description of the impact of idiosyncratic interest groups on the policy-
making process.
There are (at least) three candidates for an explanation of the differences between theory
and the stylised facts. Two of them concern the foundations of the theoretical model and the
third one concerns the empirical evidence. In regard to the empirical evidence, one has to note
that observed lobbying activities do not provide a genuine test of the predictions of the model.
The model does not predict that industry lobbies are interested in tight standards and taxes but
that tight standards and taxes are what they get as a outcome of the political process. And this is
a different matter. It is very difficult - if not impossible - to test such a hypothesis empirically.
As far as the model framework is concerned, two types of shortcomings may be responsible for
counter-intuitive results. On the one hand, real economic agents may act in a much less rational
way than the model underlying the political-support-funclion approach assumes. If this is the
case, the rationality assumption has to be substituted by something else. On the other hand, the
model lacks some of the aspects that are important in the real policy-making process. Probably
the most important of these is obfuscation. See MageelBrocklYoung (1989, ch. 18). The
political support a policy maker acquires does not only depend on the gains and losses that
accrue to different groups in society but also on the visibility of these gains and losses. From
the point of view of the policy maker, inefficient policy instruments may be useful if they allow
to hide the costs of distortive policies. For this purpose, environmental quality standards and
technological product standards may much more useful than price instruments like taxes, that
make the costs and benefits of a policy measurable and, thus, more obvious. Obfuscation could
be introduced into this model in an ad-hoc fashion rather easily but a behavioural model which
models the voter's information problems explicitly would be preferable, albeit more difficult to
construct and to solve.
This discrepancy between theoretical results and anecdotal evidence is not only a
deficiency of the model under consideration here. In general, the problem as to why in reality
inefficient policy instruments are often preferred over efficient ones is one of the puzzles that
remains to be solved by political-economy models of regulation. See Rodrik (1994) for an over-
view. Further research into this direction is needed.18
6 Lobbying Activities in the Large-Country Case
Up to now, it has been assumed that the home country is small, i.e. the foreign country
is so large that is faces no constraint on the use of the specific factor. This constraint is
introduced now. In order to keep the model tractable, assume that consumption now does not
affect environmental quality significantly and there are no taxes on consumption and no
environmental quality standards.
Total differentiation of equations (1), (I
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The results of the comparative-statics analysis are given in appendix 2. They are
straightforward and intuitive:
- Prices are raised by high emission taxes. Production of the good affected directly by such a
tax becomes more costly and part of this cost increase is passed through to the consumer.
This raises demand for the substitute good and, therefore, its price is raised as well.
- Higher emission taxes reduce emissions by the industry affected directly and raise the
emissions in the country producing the substitute good. The first effect is intuitive and the
. second one can be explained by the increased demand for the substitute good.
- High emission taxes raise the remuneration of the specific factor of the industry producing
the substitute good. The effect on the remuneration of the specific factor employed in the
industry directly affected by the tax increase is ambiguous. The underlying rationality is the
same as before. There is a positive substitution effect and a negative demand effect.
A benevolent government maximises the sum of consumer surplus, profits, the income
of the specific factor, the tax revenue and the utility derived from environmental quality.
(15) w=- e(p,P;v) + pq- c{r,t
e ,b)q + rk + t
ee + u(-ae),
Each country chooses its emission tax rate, t? and T
2, respectively. Differentiation of w and W
and the use of Shephard's lemma and of the first-order conditions of profit maximisation to








Environmental policy has a terms-of-trade effect. Similar results have been derived in other
papers in a general-equilibrium framework. See Markusen (1975), Rauscher (1991a), and
Krutilla (1992). The foreign country uses high emission taxes to raise its export price. The
home country has an incentive to use low emission tax rates in order to keep the import price
low. This may be called environmental dumping since the emission tax rate does not cover the19
marginal environmental damage. However, this policy is applied to an import-competing
industry that does not sell its output on foreign markets. Thus the term "dumping" is a bit
misleading.
Equations (16) and (16') constitute a Nash equilibrium in which both governments take
as given the emission tax rates in the other country and choose their best responses. This non-
cooperative equilibrium is not efficient since there are external effects of environmental policies
















Benevolent governments choose a less than Pigouvian emission tax rate in the home
country and a higher than Pigouvian emission tax rate in the foreign country. The home
country would benefit if the foreign government reduced the tax rate. The foreign country
would benefit if the home government raised the emission tax rate.
Figure 1: Non-cooperative environmental policies
This is represented graphically in figure 1. It is assumed here that emission taxes are
strategic substitutes, i.e. the reaction curves are negatively sloped.20 This may be interpreted as
aggressive behaviour by the two governments. An increase in the foreign country's emission tax
2
0 See Rauscher (1991b) for conditions that are sufficient for negativety sloped reaction curves in a model with
international factor mobility. There, the same kinds of externalities turn up.20
rate is bad for the home country. The home government reacts by reducing its own emission tax
rate, which is bad for the foreign country. The foreign country reacts in a similar "tit-for-tat"
fashion to tax reductions in the home country.^* This is shown in a (fi,!^) diagram where r and
R are the reaction functions of the home and the foreign governments, respectively, N is the
Nash equilibrium and w and W are the corresponding iso-welfare lines whose shapes follow
from equations (17) and (7,17'). The shaded area denotes the potential of Pareto improvements.
Both countries could be better off if the home country increased its emission tax rate and the
foreign country reduced its tax rate.




Maximisation with respect to the emission tax rates, t? and T
e, yields the following
results.
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The impacts of the lobbies on the outcome of the political process follow directly the
comparative static results:
Proposition 6
Green lobbying tends to bias emission taxes upwards. This is mitigated if environ-
mentalists care about foreign environmental quality. The impact of the specific factor's
lobbying is ambiguous.
The first part of this proposition is intuitive. The consideration of supergreen interests in the
policy-making process leads to lower taxes since low emission taxes in one country reduce the
demand for the substitute commodity and, therefore, the emissions discharged in the other
country. The. ambiguity in the impact of the specific-factor interests follows from the opposite
signs of the two effects tax changes on the remuneration of the specific factor.
The results stated in proposition 6 refer to the case where the emission tax rate in the
other country is given. I.e., the proposition shows into which direction the a country's reaction
curve is moved by the process of regulatory capture. The effect on the non-cooperative
equilibrium can be investigated most easily by means of diagrammatic methods. This is done in
figure 2 where it has been assumed that emission taxes are strategic substitutes and where only
one country is affected by regulatory capture. Regulatory capture in both countries can be
analysed easily by looking at combinations of the shifts in the reaction curves.
The term "tit for tat" does not have a game theoretic meaning here. Tit-for-tat strategies in a game theoretic
sense are possible only in repeated games but not in this static one-shot game.Figure 2: The Impact of Regulatory Capture on Environmental Policy in the Nash Equilibrium
In figure 2, the solid lines represent welfare maximising behaviour and the dashed lines
represent shifts in the reaction curves due to the influence of idiosyncratic interests on the
policy-making process. Four scenarios are depicted:
1 Domestic greens and/or industry lobbies are successful in driving the emission tax rate up.
The new equilibrium represents a Pareto improvement. Both countries are better off. The
reason is that the home country's welfare maximising tax rate is too low. It is raised by
interest group influence. This is beneficial for the foreign country and it reacts by raising its
own emission tax rate and this in turn is beneficial to the home country. If the shift in the
reaction curve were larger than in the diagram, the home country or both countries could
lose.
2 Domestic industry lobbies and/or supergreens are successful in reducing the emission tax
rate. Both countries are worse of in the new Nash equilibrium. By reducing the emission tax
rate, the home country increases the negative externality it imposes on the foreign country
and the foreign country reacts in a way detrimental to the home country's welfare.
3 Foreign lobbies raise emission taxes. Since they have been to large already, this is bad for the
home country and the home country reacts by reducing its tax rate in order to mitigate the
terms-of-trade effect of the foreign tax increase. Both countries are worse off.
4 Foreign lobbying reduces emission taxes. This is beneficial to the home country. The home
country raises its tax rate, which is beneficial to the foreign country. In this diagram,
however, this positive effect is not sufficient to offset the negative effect which is due to the
deviation from the socially optimal policy in the foreign country but a case in which both
countries are better off is also conceivable (like a scenario in which both countries lose).22
Additional scenarios are conceivable if there are lobbies in both countries. For instance, if green
lobbies are strong in both countries and are able to accomplish tax increases, then the foreign
country is likely to be better off and the home country is likely to be worse off than in a
scenario where both governments maximise social welfare. If, on the other hand, industrial
lobbies benefit from low emission tax rates and their lobbying is successful, then the home
country may benefit whereas the foreign country may lose.
Proposition 6
The effects of regulatory capture on in an international environmental policy game are
ambiguous. Both countries may gain, both countries may lose or one country may gain
whereas the other loses compared to a situation without regulatory capture.
It is interesting that lobbying activities can lead to Pareto superior results compared to
situations in which lobbies are inactive and a benevolent government maximises social welfare.
The underlying reasons is that these lobbies internalise a part of the externalities resulting from
the international policy game - of course, without the intention to do so.
As a corollary, one can conclude that institutional settings that reduce interest group in-
fluence in the policy making process are undesirable in such a situation. But is this realistic?
Probably not very much. The reasons are the following ones. Firstly, the behavioural model
underlying the political-support function approach is a model of bribery in which lobbying
activities take the shape of mere transfers. The costs of rent seeking, i.e. the allocation of
productive resources towards the non-productive activity of influencing the distribution of
wealth and income, are neglected. Thus an important source of welfare losses is missing in this
model. Secondly, it is questionable, whether real governments use environmental policies to in-
fluence the terms of trade. If they don't, there are no externalities in the international policy
game that could be internalised by the lobbies. Thirdly, the empirical evidence suggests that the
trade effects of environmental regulation are rather small. This implies that areas of Pareto
improvements are small as well and that it becomes unlikely that they are hit when lobbies
enter the arena. Finally, one may argue that emission tax rates are not the first-best policies and
that additional policy instruments be introduced into the model. If export taxes and subsidies
are feasible, then they are used to affect the terms of trade. Industry lobbies interested in high
tariffs or large export subsidies would aggravate the prisoners' dilemma of optimal tariff
policies. Environmentalists would lobby for inefficiently high emission taxes. This suggests
that, in a first-best world, lobbying is not beneficial.
7 Conclusions
1 If single policy instruments are captured by environmentalist interest groups or the lobby
supporting the interests of specific factors of production, the biases in environmental policies
take the expected directions in most of the cases. Environmentalists lobby for tight product
standards and high environmental tax rates. Industry-specific factors are interested in low
taxes on consumption. They, however, may benefit from high emission taxes and high
product standards if these policies raise the demand for these factors.
2 If environmental regulation as a whole is captured, the policy maker chooses the most
efficient means to support the interest groups. The specific factor is supported by low taxes
on consumption and high taxes on emissions. Green interests are supported by high taxes on
both consumption and emissions from production and by strict product quality standards.23
Supergreen interests are supported by high taxes on the consumption of foreign goods and
lax quality standards for these goods
3 In the large-country case where the governments play an non-cooperaiive game in emission
tax rates, regulatory capture may mitigate or amplify the problems arising from the prisoners'
dilemma of the tax game. With regulatory capture, none, one or both of the countries may be
better off than without.
4 In a setting where rent-seeking costs are taken into account and where first-best policies are
available, regulatory capture tends to reduce the welfare of all countries involved.
5 Future research should aim at providing a coherent and behaviourally well-founded theory of
"obfuscation" to explain why inefficient policy instruments are often preferred over efficient
ones by rational policy makers.
References
Bartsch, E., M. Rauschcr, I. Thomas, 1993, Environmental Legislation and the Impact of Lobbying
Activities, Kiel: Institute of World Economics Working Paper No. 556.
Becker, G.S., 1983, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98,371-400.
Brooks, M., B. Heijdra, 1989, An Exploration of Rent Seeking, Economic Record 65,32-50.
Coughlin, P.J., D.C Mueller, P. Murrell, 1990, A Model of Electoral Competition with Interest Groups,
Economics Letters 32,307-311.
Downs, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.
Grossman, G.M., E. Helpman, 1994, Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-850.
Hillman, A.L.,1989, The Political Economy of Protection, Chur: Harwood.
Hillman, A.L, H.W. Ursprung, 1992, The Influence of Environmental Concerns on the Political
Determination of International Trade Policy, in: K. Anderson, R. Blackhurst, eds., The Greening
of World Trade Issues, New York et al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 195-120.
Hillman, A.L, H.W. Ursprung, 1994, Greens, Supergreens and International Trade Policy. Environ-
mental Concerns and Protectionism, in: C. Carraro, ed., Trade, Innovation, Environment,
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 75-108.
Hoekman, B., M. Leidy, 1992, Environmental Policy Formation in a Trading Economy: A Public
•Choice Perspective, in: K. Anderson, R. Blackhurst, eds., The Greening of World Trade Issues,
New York et al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 221-246.
Klepper, G., P. Michaelis, 1995, The Economics of Cadmium Control: An Industrial Metaboism
Approach, Tubingen: Mohr.
Krutilla, K. 1991, Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 10,127-142.
Laffont, J.-J., J. Tirole, 1991, The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory
Capture, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106,1089-1127.
Leidy, M.P., B.M. Hoekman, 1994, 'Cleaning up
1 while Cleaning up? Pollution Abatement, Interest
Groups and Contingent Trade Policies, Public Choice 78,241-258.24
Magee, S., 1980, Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, in: P. Oppenheimer, ed:
Issues in International Economics, London: Oriel Press, 138-153.
Magee, S., W.A. Brock, L. Young, 1989, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political
Economy in General Equilibrium, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Maloney, M.T., R.E: McCormick, 1982, A Positive Theory of Environmental Policy Formation,
Journal of Law and Economics 25,99-123.
Markusen, J.R., 1975, International Externalities and Optimal Tax Structures, Journal of International
Economics 5,15-29.
Mitchell, W., M. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, American
Journal of Political Science 35,512-546.
Mayer, W., 1984, Endogenous Tariff Formation, American Economic Review 74,970-985.
Niskanen, W., 1977, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago.
Nitzan, S., 1994, Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests, European Journal of Political Economy 10,41-60.
Olson, M., 1965, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pearce, D.W., R.K. Turner, 1990, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment, New York:
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Peltzman, S., 1976, Toward a More General Theory of Regulatory Capture, Journal of Law and
Economics 19,211-240.
Rauscher, M., 1991a, Foreign Trade and the Environment, in: H. Siebert, ed., Environmental Scarcity:
The International Dimension, Tubingen: Mohr, 17-31.
Rauscher, M., 1991b, National Environmental Policies and the Effects of Economic Integration.
European Journal of Political Economy 7,313-329.
Rodrik, D., 1994, What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (not) Tell Us that We
Ought to Know, London: CEPR discussion paper no. 1039.
Siebert, H., 1994, Economics of the Environment, 4th ed., Berlin: Springer.
Stigler, G.J.,4971, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science 3,137-146.
Tullock, G., 1980, Efficient Rent Seeking, in: J.M. Buchanan, P.D. Tollison, G. Tullock, eds., Toward a
Theory of the Rent-Seeeking Society, College Station, TX: Texas A.&M. University Press, 97-
112.
Ursprung, H.W., 1991, Economic Policies and Political Competition, in: A.L. Hillman, Markets and
Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice, Boston: Kluwer, 1-25.
Varian, H. R., 1992, Microeconomic Analysis, New York: Norton.
Vpusden, N, 1990, The Economics of Trade Proetection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, L., S.P. Magee, 1986, Endogenous Protection, Factor Returns and Resource Allocation, Review
of Economic Studies 53,407-419.25
A Appendix: Comparative Static Results
Al The Small-Country Case
From equation (4), we have
(Ala) ± = -«Z-^\






(Alc) 4=^-w>0 (Alc) ^a_^+w





dfi) +d/ Q> (Mf) qcrr+dpc/ d(o qcrr+dpc
(Alg) i = -i^>0, (Alh) ±a dP qcrr+dpcr
The effects on the quantities are obtained via the demand functions, i.e.
rff
c qc+dc/












(A2g) ^ = _J^L_>0, (A2h) jga
Domestic emissions, e, are determined by Shephard's lemma: e = c,q . It follows that























For the effects on foreign emissions, we obtain























A2 The Large-Country Case
From equation (14), we have
-<lCR
2Dp{ctcn-crtcr)
dt° qcrr [QCRR + CR
2Dp]+ Cr^idpQCm + CR
2{dpDP - dPDp))'
to -qcrt (QCRR + CR
2DP) - ctcr(dpQCRR + CR
2{dpDP - dPDp)) (A5c)
dR _ CRDpq{crcrt-ctcrr
dt




Using the demand functions, we obtain
( A5e) —— = 1 r T 1 r-r,
dt
e qcrr\QCRR + CR
2DP) + cr





e q£rr [QCRR + CR
2DP) + c
2 \dpQCM + CR
2{dpDP-dPDp))'
Finally, emissions, e and E, are determined by Shephard's lemma, e = ctq and E = C^Q. It
follows that









The previous results can be inserted and this yields
de





(A6b) -— = 7—. ——v -7 ; —T
rff «crr(QCRR + CR
2DPj + c
2[d QCRR + CR
2{d DP-dPD
The effects of the regulation of the foreign industry, T
6 can be obtained by analogous reasoning since
the model is symmetric.